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1CAN THE INTELLECTUAL  STILL  SPEAK?  THE  EXAMPLE  OF  DON DELILLO'S 
MAOII
The great danger to avoid is the self-isolating nature of 
critical discourse.
Jean Starobinski
When Roland Barthes wrote and published his «The Death of the Author», he cast 
doubts upon one of the chief mainstays of Western culture. With the disappearance 
of  the  Author  ─I'd  rather  understand this  death  not  as  disappearance but  as 
fragmentation─ the status of the so called universal intellectual (obviously male, 
white and middle or upper-class) was also indirectly questioned. This  ─obviously 
together with other economic, social and political factors─ led to the crisis in which 
part of the intelligentsia is now living and that some are using not only to discredit 
the individual figure of the intellectual but also to account for a society whose roots 
seems  to  be  ahistorical  or  deeply  mythical,  in  which,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Holocaust  or  Italian  Fascism,  history  can  be  cancelled  and  rewritten  as  the 
revisionists please.
But if  the author  and the subject are now  ─even though with a certain 
difficulty and some resistance─ reconstructing themselves in a different way ─and I 
think of  the birth  of  different  forms of  identity  that,  with the help of  history, 
Foucault was starting to theorize some time before his death─ what is happening to 
the  intellectual?  Can  some  writers  still  consider  themselves  to  be  committed 
intellectuals? Or perhaps we should ask: does it mean anything now to talk about a 
writer as a committed intellectual? Must we classify literature as «unproductive», 
and for this reason declare the death of intellectuals as writers because they do not 
2fulfill the requirements of a society which is more and more predisposed to the 
most vulgar, conservative and dangerous technocracy? The concern of this paper 
is to argue that the intellectual as writer  ─and I consider the writer as a specific 
intellectual─ is still important, alive and somehow necessary in our contemporary 
social  context.  For  this  reason,  in  the  following  section  I  will  introduce  the 
Foucauldian concept of specific intellectual and the Barthesian idea of the writer as 
intellectual before, in the third part of this paper, relating the idea of the writer as 
specific intellectual to Don DeLillo's Mao II.
In Mao II, DeLillo faces up to most of the contradictions which are present in 
contemporary society and culture and through the peculiar structure of the book 
helps us to enter a world mainly ruled by pictures and violence. The society in 
which the writer-protagonist of the book lives hidden from everybody is dominated 
by postmodern pastiche, images and spectacle. I find DeLillo's writing interesting 
not only because it represents a committed criticism of contemporary culture and 
society  but  also  because this  criticism is  carried  out  within  a  text  where  the 
frustrated quest for identity of the American hero merges with the representation 
of a postmodern world which DeLillo synthesizes in the portraits that Andy Warhol 
did of Mao Tse-tung, Marilyn Monroe and Gorbachev, icons of a society where 
images and myth prevail. The hero, in spite of his desperate quest, and in betrayal 
of the American tradition, is incapable of finding a new identity ─let alone his old 
one─ and ends up dying on a boat where nobody knows him while going from 
Greece to Lebanon. From the West to the East.
DeLillo's main character thus offer us an opportunity to start reflecting on 
the relation that writing maintains with subjectivity without, at the same time, 
3losing sight of a committed vision of writing itself. I am not going to go back to the 
idea of the universal intellectual  ─although I think that DeLillo from time to time 
does consider yielding to the temptation; what I  want to stress rather is how 
DeLillo's text manages to reflect the transformation of the idea of the writer as a 
universal intellectual into the idea of the writer as a specific intellectual.
II
At the beginning of the 1970s Michel Foucault started to develop in a more 
detailed way his theory of power relations. His interest was framed not only within 
his own philosophical and intellectual project but, at the same time, reacted to the 
concerns of a society which was changing quickly. It was the same society that 
during May 1968 had abruptly woken up and that for a long time believed in the 
chance of a real transformation of the existing structures without realizing that the 
international failure of the student movement was leading to the frustration of 
unfulfilled promises and to the consequent terrorist abjection1. Gilles Deleuze, in an 
interview with Foucault on the role of intellectuals, declared that the figure who 
until then had been considered to be a theorist could not be seen anymore as a 
1      Just to give an example of the political climate of the end of the seventies in Italy I 
want to quote some phrases from an interview published in the Italian weekly magazine 
Panorama (25-8-1991) on the occasion of the release of Renato Curcio, founder of the Red 
Brigades. The person who speaks (his name is not mentioned in order to protect him from 
any possible retaliation) used to be a close associate of General Dalla Chiesa (assassinated 
together with his wife and the members of his escort by the Mafia) and gives a chilling list 
of people who were assassinated by the terrorrists when Curcio was first put into jail and 
before the trial: « ... on the 10th [of March 1978] his comrades killed Rosario Bernardi, 
officer of the anti-terrorist brigade. On the 16th they kidnapped Aldo Moro and killed the 
five  men of  his  escort.  On the  11th  of  April  the  prison warder  Lorenzo Cotugno was 
assassinated. On the 20th they killed Marshal Franco Di Cataldo. On the 9th of May they 
liquidated  the  President  of  the  Christian  Democracy  [Aldo  Moro].  On  the  22nd  they 
massacred the police inspector Antonio Esposito» p. 49, my translation.  
4subject and as a result of this, the intellectual was not to be seen anymore as the 
«representative  consciousness»  of  society:«For  us  the  intellectual  theorist  has 
ceased to be a subject, a representing and representative consciousness ... there is 
no longer any representation, there is only action, theory's action, the action of 
practice in the relationships of networks»2.
It was in this context and in relation to his criticism of traditional Western 
epistemology,  that  Foucault  started  to  connect  more  firmly  the  role  that  the 
intellectual and culture play in the frame of the power relations that construct the 
subject.  His can be considered one of the answers to the collapse of classical 
theorization of, for example, the Sartreian universal intellectual in the post-war 
period. Foucault rejects this idea because he considers that it is directly related to 
the idea of the existence of an absolute Truth with its corresponding essentialist 
and  universal  subject.  In  the  Foucauldian  philosophical  project  there  is  no 
epistemological justification to support the idea of the existence of an intellectual 
figure who can be considered to be the universal thinking subject. On the contrary, 
the Foucauldian specific intellectual is not interested in speaking on behalf of other 
people. Each intellectual works in her or his own field to give the various social 
groups the tools which will enable them to speak for themselves and according to 
their different needs. The role of the intellectual has diversified3 together with the 
2      Gilles Deleuze, «Intellectuals and Power», (Interview Michel Foucault-Gilles Deleuze) in 
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault, 
Donald F. Bouchard, ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977),  pp. 206-7.
3      «This task [...] is also an attempt to locate the intellectual's freedom at the point of 
his/her limitations ─the point at which desire meets with processes of subjectivization, the 
place where identity forms», Karlis Racevskis, «Michel Foucault, Rameau's Nephew and the 
Question  of  Identity»,  in  The Final  Foucault,  Bernauer,  James-Rasmussen,  David,  eds., 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1988), p. 31.
5multiple foci in which Foucauldian power relations act within the social network. All 
intellectuals  belong  to  this  chain,  that  is  to  say  to  the  power/knowledge 
relantionship, and their role as specific intellectuals is to resist the idea which 
portrays them as the «consciousness and eloquence» of Western epistemology.  
But what about Roland Barthes? How does he situate the intellectual within 
the cultural scene and with respect to the death of the author? I think that the 
discourse on intellectuals in the Barthesian text also answers the need to fragment 
and burst open the inner structures of writing as one possible answer to the logic 
of Western Epistemology. In many of Barthes's later texts the necessity of staying 
outside  the  system  and  breaking  all  that  ties  our  culture  to  the  culture  of 
stereotype is evident.
According to Barthes, the universal intellectual is what is left of the heritage 
of a past time when his word had a prophetic meaning and represented the voice 
of  authority4.  With  the  death  of  the  Author,  this  charismatic,  and  indeed 
androcentric, figure disappears. If for Foucault this gave way to the birth of the 
specific intellectual, for Barthes the disappearance has been definitive, and he 
declares that the only thing left by the intellectual is his spoor: «Les optimistes 
disent que l'intellectuel est un `témoin'. Je dirais plutôt qu'il n'est qu'une `trace'»5.
I would argue that this affirmation has to be understood as a fragmentation 
of the idea of the intellectual and not as the confirmation of his death. The «death 
4      «H-L: Il fut un temps où les intellectuels se prenaient, se pensaient comme le `sel de 
la terre'...
R.B.: Je dirais pour ma part qu'ils sont plutôt le déchet de la société. Le déchet au sens 
strict, c'est-à-dire ce qui ne sert à rien, à moins qu'on le recupère [...] En un certain sens, 
les intellectuels ne servent à rien», Roland Barthes, «A quoi sert un intellectuel?», in  Le 
grain de la voix. Entretiens 1962-1980 (Éditions du Seuil: Paris, 1981), p. 256.
5      Roland Barthes, ibid., p. 257.
6of  the  author»  describes  not  a  disappearance  but  the  birth  of  different 
subjectivities,  that  manifest  themselves,  for  example,  in  the  questioning  and 
opening of  the Canon.  Nevertheless  I  should stress  that  Barthes's  analysis  of 
intellectuals includes his concern with language («Disons simplement que je suis 
sans doute le trace d'un intérêt historique pour le langage; el aussi la trace de 
multiples engouements, modes, termes noveaux»6).  For this reason it might be 
interesting to approach the Barthesian intellectual through the criticism of meaning 
that Barthes developed in his cultural project from the very beginning (and which 
remained as a firm point of reference till the end of his life). The Barthesian writer, 
that is to say, acts in a system based on a very clearly specified number of rules 
that are defined by the mythology of culture. The myth, according to Barthes, is a 
message which society creates within a specific historical frame and afterwards 
uses to build up the structures of stereotypes. Multiple languages are used simply 
to  repeat  the  same  Discourse.  It  could  be  said  that  they  function  like  the 
Foucauldian commentary:
... car le mythe est une parole choisie par l'histoire: il ne saurait 
surgir de la «nature» des choses. Cette parole est un message. Elle peut 
donc être bien autre chose qu'orale; elle peute être formée d'écritures 
ou de représentations: le discours écrit, mais aussi la photographie, le 
cinéma, le reportage, le sport, les spectacles, la publicité, tout cela peut 
servir de support à la parole mythique7.
Myth does not lie.  (It  would be very difficult  for a picture to lie,  just  to 
mention an example which reminds us of the last barthesian text Camera Lucida; 
6      Id.
7      Roland Barthes, «Le mythe, aujourd'hui» in  Mythologies (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 
1957), p. 194.
7the person who is looking at that picture knows perfectly well that she is looking at 
something which exists or has existed somewhere). What we can ask at this point 
though  is  how can  the  myth  ─which  is  the  language  of  a  specific  historical 
moment8─ become such a powerful instrument of cultural control? According to 
Barthes this is because the myth tends to transform itself into nature, that is to say 
into the essence. Within his framework of power relations Foucault developed the 
idea of the specific intellectual;  so how does Barthes face the task of fighting 
against the creation of mutiple discourses which transform myth from historical 
product into the essence, that is to say into something that never changes and is 
always identical  to  itself?  His  solution,  as we all  know,  lies  in  the subversive 
potential  of  the literary text.  And to understand this  we have to refer  to  the 
impossibility of the existence of the literary text outside Ideology. Barthes argues 
that no text can exist outside the limits imposed by the ideological apparatuses. 
The subversion of the text, in other words, consists in its capacity to flourish within 
this frame and at the same time to be able to create its own chiaroscuro, to change 
the perspective we get of the known phenomenological world and present it in a 
way9 which is  different, and I give to this adjective all the connotations that are 
present in both Barthesian and Foucauldian texts.
8      «... on peut concevoir des mythes très anciens, il n'y en a pas d'éternels; car c'est 
l'histoire humaine qui fait passer le réel à l'état de parole, c'est elle et elle seule qui règle 
la vie et la mort du langage mythique. Lointaine ou non, la mythologie ne peut avoir qu'un 
fondement historique, car le mythe est une parole choisie par l'histoire: il ne saurait surgir 
de la `nature' des choses», Roland Barthes, «Le mythe, aujourd'hui», Mythologies, p. 194.
9      «There are those who want a text (an art, a painting) without a shadow, without "the 
dominant ideology"; but this is to want a text without fecundity, without productivity, a 
sterile text (see the Myth of the Woman without a Shadow). The text needs its shadow: this 
shadow is a bit of ideology, a bit of representation, a bit of subject: ghosts, pockets, traces, 
necessary clouds:  subversion must  produce its  own chiaroscuro» Roland Barthes,  The 
Pleasure of the Text (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975), p. 32.
8 For Barthes as for Foucault then, history assumes an important role in the 
definition of what it means to be an intellectual. «The writer is always on the blind 
spot of system, adrift; he is the joker in the pack, a  mana, a zero degree, the 
dummy in the bridge game: necessary to the meaning (the battle), but himself 
deprived of fixed meaning; his place, his (exchange) value, varies according to the 
movements of history, the tactical blows of the struggle; he is asked all and/or 
nothing»10.
III
Mao II is the story of a famous, much-admired writer who can no longer find 
a satisfying place in contemporary society; it is for this reason that he decides to 
hide  while  he  tries  to  write  his  last  book.  The  writer  feels  displaced  as  an 
intellectual, and his writing loses the capacity of representing his chiaroscuro in a 
world which is dominated by terrorism. Each character symbolizes an aspect of a 
society which apparently has lost all unity but which, paradoxically, is moving in a 
single direction. The book that Bill Gray is writing is a text which, significantly, he 
thinks will never be finished: 
The language of my books has shaped me as a man. There's a 
moral force in a sentence when it comes out right. It speaks the writer's 
will to live. The deeper I become entangled in the process of getting a 
sentence right  in  its  syllables  and rhythms,  the more  I  learn  about 
myself. I've worked the sentences of this book long and hard but not 
long and hard enough because I no longer see myself in the language11.
10      Ibid., p. 35.
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9Language does not give back to the writer the image of himself he was used 
to seeing. Bill has lost control of the grammatical structures and the lexicon («On 
the stage of the text, no footlights: there is not, behind the text, someone active 
(the writer) and out front someone passive (the reader); there is not a subject and 
an object»)12. The situation that Bill is going through can thus be interpreted as the 
result of the questioning the very idea of authorship. It is for this reason that Bill 
feels he is not capable of publishing his book; he cannot do it because he feels that 
it is not his writing anymore. And the work of revision that he carries out day by 
day is absolutely useless: the text keeps on slipping from his grasp. And so Bill 
decides  to leave his  hiding place and agrees to be photographed by Brita,  a 
professional  photographer  who  only  takes  pictures  of  writers.  He  is  slowly 
capitulating to the pressures of the outside world and he tells Brita so in these 
words: «There's a curious knot that binds novelists and terrorists. In the West we 
become famous effigies as our books lose the power to shape and influence. Do 
you ask your writers how they feel about this?» (MII, 41). In this quotation two 
ideas that will become the backbone of the novel appear: the relation between 
terrorists and writers and that between writers and images13. 
Why after so many years of isolation does Bill Gray decide to publish his 
photograph and not his book? As we already know, Bill has a conflictive relation 
with his novel, that is to say with the text he is writing. This text does not recognize 
      Don Delillo, Mao II (London: Vintage, 1992 [1991]), p.43. From now on I will refer to 
DeLillo's novel as MII, with the page number.
12      Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, p. 16.
13      See Douglas Keesey's Don DeLillo (New York: Twayne, 1993). Pp.: 177-193.
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him as the «Author» but as somebody that Barthes defined as a «white card» or as 
the Joker. When Bill feels that he has lost his identity as a writer (and above all as a 
committed writer) what he desperately needs is another identity. The camera can 
give him what he needs at this moment, an image which is able to tell him that, in 
spite of everything, he still exists as Bill Gray, the writer. This is what Barthes writes 
in  Camera Lucida:  «Now, once I  feel  myself  observed by the lens,  everything 
changes: I constitute myself in the process of `posing', I  instantaneously make 
another body for myself, I transform myself in advance into an image»14.
For this reason Bill gives up his privacy and agrees to be transformed into an 
image and, significantly, the person who does it is a woman photographer who left 
her previous field of research (in the poor outskirts of town) to devote herself to 
going around the world taking pictures of writers. Through her job the impossibility 
of writing is transformed into a collection of images of people who write:
It took me a long time to find out what I wanted to photograph. I 
came to this country it's fifteen years. To this city actually. And I roamed 
the streets first day, taking pictures of city faces, eyes of city people, 
slashed men, prostitutes, emergency rooms, forget it, I did this for years 
[...]  But  after  years  of  this  I  began  to  think  it  was  somehow, 
strangely─not valid [...] Then you know what you want to do at last [...] I 
will just keep on photographing writers, every one I can reach, novelists, 
poets, playwrights [...] This is what I do now. Writers (MII, 24).
If we keep on following Barthesian thought we could even say that the image 
transforms the referents15 ─which in our case are represented by the portrayed 
14      Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida (London: Vintage 1993), p. 10.
15      «And the person or thing photographed is the target, the referent, a kind of little 
simulacrum, any eidolon emitted by the object, which I should like to call the Spectrum of 
the photograph because this word retains, through its root, a relation to `spectacle' and 
adds to it that rather terrible thing which is there in every photograph: the return of the 
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writers─ into  a  simulacrum of  what  they  used  to  mean  at  another  historical 
moment. In other words I think that the idea that we receive from the picture of the 
writer can be related to a representation of death, to something that has already 
disappeared and does not exist anymore: the author is dead and can only come 
back to us through a photograph, that is to say through an image that has been 
emptied of any other meaning («He said, `The book is finished but will remain in 
typescript. Then Brita's photos appear in a prominent place. Timed just right. We 
don't  need the book.  We have the author'» MII,  71).  Images occupy quite an 
important  place in the narrative of  Mao II and in one way or  another all  the 
characters  relate  to  them.  (In  Camera  Lucida Roland  Barthes  stresses  the 
overwhelming presence of images in our society with the following words: «I see 
photographs everywhere, like everyone else, nowadays: they come from the world 
to me, without my asking: they are only `images', their mode of appearance is 
heterogeneous»16.)
In fact  DeLillo's novel  establishes a unity among the different parts into 
which it is divided through the world of images and their tendency to transform 
every human action into spectacle. In the first part, for example, Bill Gray lives with 
two young persons who take care of him and look after the house, Scott and Karen. 
Karen lives obsessed by images and the news is the only thing she watches on 
televison; she watches it without the sound, she simply looks and is not interested 
in listening. She is not interested in language because it does not mean anything to 
her, she is only interested in seeing because as Guy Debord writes with his usual 
dead» ibid., p. 9.
16      Ibid., p. 16.
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irony «Spectacle has mixed with reality and has irradiated it»17. Karen's gaze is, 
obviously, subjective and her personal experience reflects what she absorbs from 
the totality of the images that reach her. For this reason, while she is watching the 
news on the student rebellion in China in May 1989, Karen simply notices the 
enormous portrait of Mao-ZeDong, the same portrait that her friend Scott keeps in 
his bedroom and which is a reproduction of the famous one done by Andy Warhol:
They show the portrait of Mao up close, a clean new picture, and 
he has those little mounds of hair that bulge out of his head and the 
great wart below his mouth that she tries to recall if the wart appears on 
the version Andy drew with a pencil that she has on the wall in the 
bedroom at home. Mao Zedong. She likes that name all right. But it is 
funny how a picture. It is funny how a picture what? She hears a car 
alarm go off in the street (MII, 177-178).
In the last part of the novel, «In Beirut», the enormous tragedy a whole 
nation is going through is mediated and described through the images that Brita 
sees from the window of her car. The language that DeLillo uses is dry and the 
sentences are short; there are no comments on people or the despair produced by 
war, just a list of images of people and of the war that merge with the ads: «The 
streets run with images. They cover walls and clothing─ pictures of martyrs, clerics, 
fighting men, holidays in Tahiti» (MII, 229).
Bill tries to rebel against all this, above all for himself, and for this reason 
accepts the proposal that his editor Charlie Everson makes to him to talk on behalf 
of a young poet who has been kidnapped by a maoist group in Beirut; but the press 
conference that Charlie thinks of organizing in London is, as well, mere spectacle: 
17      Guy Debord Comentarios sobre la sociedad del espectáculo (Barcelona: Anagrama, 
1990), p. 20. My translation.
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«I want one missing writer to read the work of another. I want the famous novelist 
to address the suffering of the unknown poet. I want the English-language writer to 
read in French and the older man to speak across the night to his young colleague 
in letters. Don't you see how beautifully balanced?» (MII, 98)
The London meeting fails because a bomb explodes in the place that the 
British police had chosen for the conference. Nonetheless, it is in London that Bill 
starts to relate to a mysterious man, George, an intellectual who lives in Athens 
and who is the contact with the terrorists in Beirut. Bill Gray decides to reject the 
publicity, runs away from London and fly to Athens to go on acting on his own. In 
Athens he meets George and it is during a conversation that the two men hold in 
George's place when all the main elements present in the novel converge; in a few, 
solid, vigorous pages the intellectual, and through him the terrorists, face up to the 
writer.
By going away from London and from the press conference that Charlie 
Everson had organized, Bill  tries to rebel against the society which transforms 
everything into spectacle and himself into the image of a writer; he tries to take 
back his  own destiny and so  demonstrate to himself  that  he still  exists  as a 
committed  intellectual.  Little  by  little,  his  quest  for  his  lost  identity  becomes 
desperate. From his point of view, the strength of ideas has fallen to the force of 
violence  and  if,  on  the  one  hand,  the  author  is  dead,  on  the  other  hand, 
authoritarianism has won the battle because it has been able to transform itself 
into something spectacular.
Bill and George represent two sides of contemporary culture. The writer and 
the terrorist are two mythical figures within our cultural codes who, through the 
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dynamics  of  history  see  their  roles  and  places  completely  changed  in 
contemporary society. If the writer has lost the power to change or influence the 
social  fabric  with his work,  then the terrorist  has learnt to use the society of 
spectacle  and  of  images  in  his  favour.  Bill's  fear  and  doubts  are  patent  and 
materialize in the following quotation where we can sense his nostalgia for the 
writer/intellectual who used to be society's conscience:
«For  some  time  now  I've  had  the  feeling  that  novelists  and 
terrorists are playing a zero-sum game». «Interesting. How so?» «What 
terrorists gain, novelists lose. The degree to which they influence mass 
consciousness is the extent of our decline as shapers of sensibility and 
thought.  The  danger  they  represent  equals  our  own  failure  to  be 
dangerous». «And the more clearly we see terror, the less impact we 
feel from art» (MII, 129-130)
George here uses the verb to see to refer to terror, but terror belongs to the 
sphere of feelings and we should feel it and not see it. Once more the act of seeing 
and the gaze are presented as basic elements to understand the balancing game 
that  the two men are playing while the ghosts of  unknown hostages  ─whose 
pictures can be transformed into a lethal weapon─ are fluctuating between them: 
«Gain the maximum attention.  Then probably kill  you ten minutes later.  Then 
photograph your corpse and keep the picture handy for the time when it can be 
used most effectively» (MII, 165). The dialectical confrontation between Bill and 
George shifts on two completely different levels: while the first talks of contents, 
the second never stops relating the content to the image. Guy Debord in his 
Comentarios sobre la sociedad del espectáculo, not only attacks passionately the 
theorists of the end of history but stresses how the society of images has become 
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a basic element in undermining the bases of all historical thought, and a dangerous 
backward  step  to  a  mythical  conception  of  human  events:  «The  valuable 
advantage that spectacle has obtained from situating history outside the law, from 
sentencing all  recent  history to clandestinity  and helping to forget,  in general 
terms, the historical spirit of society means, in the first place, hiding its own history: 
the movement of its recent conquest of the world»18.
The myth as history is patent in the defence that George makes of the 
terrorist and the use of real violence. Images are the only weapon left to those 
who, according to George, fight in the name of justice: «But this is precisely the 
language of being noticed, the only language the West understands. The way they 
determine how we see them» (MII,  157).  Then he goes back to compare the 
writer's job to the role that terrorists play in contemporary society: «It's the novelist 
who understands the secret life, the rage that underlies all obscurity and neglect. 
You're half murderers, most of you» (MII, 158).
Bill's answer reflects the refusal of an absolute Truth and of a figure who can 
eventually become a kind of God and a creator of Truth, of something that holds 
the right of life and death over other people. In this context to deny the inmutable 
meaning that myth gives to the figure of the terrorist as defender of truth whatever 
the cost, means to become aware of the role of history to deny that any image is 
`natural' («No. It's pure myth, the terrorist as solitary outlaw. These groups are 
backed by repressive governments. They're perfect little totalitarian states. They 
carry the old wild-eyed vision, total destruction and total order») (MII, 158). Facing 
up to a discourse that tries to transform him into something that he absolutely 
18      Ibid., p. 27. My translation.
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rejects, obliges Bill  to go back to his writing as the only possible answer. Bill's 
rebellion materializes in the attempt to give back to the hostage an identity that is 
not the one that images suggest: «He could have told George he was writing about 
the hostage to bring him back, to return a meaning that had been lost to the world 
when they locked him in the room» (MII, 200).
The real tragedy described in the novel, then is that the captured poet is 
used  by  everyone  ─nobody  is  interested  in  him  as  a  human  being.  George 
theorizes on the hostage's position, the terrorists think of him simply as a means to 
obtain something for their cause and Bill, in his own way, does the same. None of 
these people talk of the poet as a person; each of them sees him in an absolute 
way, wether as the price that society has to pay for a cause or as a way of 
recovering a lost identity. Bill's interest is thus directed not towards the prisoner 
but towards an idea in danger, the idea of the writer as intellectual and thinking 
being: «You put a man in a room and lock the door. There's something serenely 
pure here. Let's destroy the mind that makes words and sentences» (MII, 161).
So the  contemporary  writer/intellectual  is  represented by  three  different 
points of view: those of the author as deus ex-machina (an idea that, as we will 
see, still lives on in Mao's works); of the writer who has lost his identity and the 
meaning of his work; and of the silenced writer about whom nobody worries and of 
whom, by the end of  the novel,  nothing will  be left  but a faded unimportant 
memory.
Mao Tse-tung's writings are the materialization of the idea of the Author as 
creator  of  meaning,  a  concept  that  George  shares  and  considers  of  basic 
importance for the development of a revolutionary thought: «There are different 
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ways in which words are sacred [...] Mao said this. And he wrote and he wrote. He 
became the  history  of  China  written  on  the  masses.  And  his  words  became 
immortal.  Studied,  repeated,  memorized  by  an  entire  nation».  «Incantations. 
People chanting formulas and slogans» (MII, 161-162).
Here we have the discourse of what is considered true; in this case it is the 
interpretation  that  George gives  of  Mao's  discourse  which  is  repeated until  it 
becomes the only valid one, that is to say the Discourse of the Same. For this 
reason, this discourse becomes a myth and takes for granted an ahistorical and 
immortal dimension: sacred is how George defines it. What is sacred and mythical 
has to be accepted as a dogma, it deletes history and lays the theoretical bases of 
Discourse One: «The Little Red Book of Quotations. The book was the faith that 
people carried everywhere» (MII, 161).
George is looking for ─and defends─ the elimination of difference: he wants 
an ideology in which unity can be encountered and totality analyzed. If we see 
things from this point of view, from the perspective of any totalitarian discourse (or 
from the perspective of other so-called democratic discourses19), we should not be 
surprised  that  the  only  viable  project  is  the  terrorist  one,  that  is  to  say  the 
discourse  of  the  elimination  of  difference  either  through  assassination  by  the 
terrorist or by a State that declares itself democratic: «It's an idea. It's a picture of 
Lebanon  without  the  Syrians,  Palestinians  and  Israelis,  without  the  Iranian 
19      «In all the places where spectacle reigns the only organized forces are the ones that 
want the spectacle. For this reason, none of them can be an enemy of what exists, nor can 
they transgress the  omertà that involves everything. That disturbing conception, which 
ruled for two hundred years, according to which a society could be open to criticism and 
transformable, reformed or revolutionary is over. And this has not been obtained with the 
appearance of new reasonings but simply because reasonings have become useless. With 
this  result  we will  measure,  more than the social  welfare,  the terrible strength of  the 
networks of tyranny» Guy Debord, ibid., p. 34. My translation.
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volunteers, the religious wars. We need a model that transcends all  the bitter 
history.  Something enormous and commanding. A figure of absolute being» (MII, 
158, my emphasis).
The  resistance  which  Bill  Gray  opposes  to  this  authorial  figure  ─who 
eventually becomes a kind of God in whose name the destiny of a whole people 
can be changed and assassination and kidnapping justified from a theoretical point 
of view─  is not enough. Bill's cry of protest («Do you know why I believe in the 
novel? It's a democratic shout. Anybody can write a great novel [...] One thing 
unlike another, one voice unlike the next. Ambiguities, contradictions, whispers, 
hints.  And this is what you want to destroy») (MII,  159) gets lost in a society 
dominated by rules which regulate the spectacle and transform everything into an 
image.
As had already happened in London with Charlie Everson, Bill decides to run 
away from George's logic and face alone what he will find in Lebanon, but he does 
not get to Beirut because, as I have already noted, he dies on the ferry. His quest 
for identity ends up a complete failure. The famous writer who used to live hidden 
from  everybody  disappears  forever.  On  the  ferry  somebody  steals  all  his 
documents and what is left of him is just a nameless corpse on a boat and a series 
of pictures. At the end of his life, and without looking for it, Bill Gray is transformed 
into the thing that he had wanted to avoid: a silent image with a writer's name.
The hostage, the writer silenced by violence, also disappears in the oblivion 
of  the  society  of  spectacle  that  continuously  needs  new  emotions  and  new 
scandals. It is Brita who takes an interest in the man while she is taking pictures of 
Abu Rashid, boss of the terrorists who had kidnapped him, and the answer she gets 
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is blood-curdling:
«What happened to the hostage?» [...]  He says,  «We have no 
foreign sponsors. Sometimes we do business the old way. You sell this, 
you trade that. Always there are deals in the works. So with hostages. 
Like drugs, like weapons, like jewelry, like a Rolex or a BMW. We sold him 
to the fundamentalists». Brita thinks about this. «And they are keeping 
him,» she says. «They are doing whatever they are doing» (MII, 235).
The writer, and together with the writer the intellectual, apparently has not 
survived contemporary culture. The overwhelming message of violence and the 
annhilation  of  any  feature  which  might  bring  us  to  accept  difference  and 
multiplicity seem to be the only thing left. The boys who surround Abu Rashid, for 
example, keep their faces constantly covered, but they do not do so to protect 
themselves from being recognised and put into jail but in order to demonstrate 
that they accept the uniformity that their boss's ideology demands of them: «The 
interpreter says, `The boys who work near Abu Rashid have no face or speech. 
Their  features are identical.  They are his features.  They don't  need their  own 
features or voices. They are surrending these things to something powerful and 
great'» (MII, 234).
In spite of a progressive sense of defeat that pervades the reader as he or 
she goes on reading the book, I think that DeLillo's novel can be read as a text 
with, to use Barthes's words, a literary subversive potential. In Mao II Don DeLillo 
manages to give life to his own game of lights and shadows and gives the reader a 
perspective of the various clichés of contemporary society and culture. In our case 
the  writer  is  the  intellectual  who  acts  in  a  specific  context  ─the  text.  The 
intellectual who in the novel is obviously unable to change or influence society and 
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is silenced by circumstances that are already out of control, on the other hand 
keeps on talking and writing through the hand of Delillo himself. His novel, which is 
such a hard and desperate one, demonstrates that the writer has to write and 
through his or her writing develops a criticism of meaning ─or of the lack of it─ not 
only of the false multiplicity of discourses that has been created by the society of 
spectacle, but of myth and of the so-called end of history as well. It is in this sense 
that I understand what Frank Lentricchia writes20 on Delillo's capacity to shape his 
own chiaroscuro within the frame of history and of ideology without losing sight of 
the necessity of questioning the dangerously mythical and ahistorical society that 
some contemporary critics, theorists and politicians are helping to define.
DeLillo's  use of  history as  a subversive tool  with  which  he manages to 
represent another reality, questions and presents from a different perspective the 
official versions and rules that the society of spectacle imposes on the viewer ─or 
the reader in our case─ and makes me think both of Barthesian writers capacity to 
depict  their  own  chiaroscuro within  a  specific  ideology,  and the role  that  the 
Foucauldian specific intellectuals play within the power/knowledge relation. The 
capacity that DeLillo shows in  Mao II to use and relate to one another concepts 
such  as  history,  subjectivity  and  writing,  while  opening  a  new  and  different 
perspective, synthesizes and lumps together the Barthesian and the Foucauldian 
ideas of what an intellectual should be:
20      «In [...] their historical rigor, I suspect, lies their political outrage: the unprecedented 
degree to which they prevent their readers from gliding off into the comfortable sentiment 
that the real problems of the human race have always been about what they are today» 
Frank  Lentricchia,  «Introduction»,  New Essays  on  White  Noise (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 6.
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The role of an intellectual is not to tell others what they have to 
do [...] The work of an intellectual is not to shape others' political will; it 
is  through the analysis that  he carries out in his  [sic]  own field,  to 
question over and over what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb 
people's mental habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate 
what is familiar and accepted, to reexamine rules and institutions and 
on the basis  of  this  reproblematization (in  which  he carries  out  his 
specific  task  as  an intellectual)  to  participate  in  the  formation  of  a 
political will (in which he has his role as citizen to play)21.
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21      Michel Foucault,  «The Concern for Truth», in Lawrence D. Kritzman, ed.,  Michel 
Foucault. Politics, Philosophy, Culture, (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 265.
